The authors would like to thank Jeanette Diamond, Michael O'Hara, Baldev Raj, two anonymous referees, and participants at the Midwest Econometric Meetings for helpful suggestions on an earlier draft. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be construed to be those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.
1

Introduction
The theory of covered interest parity (CIP) links money market interest rates to spot and forward exchange rates. Models of foreign exchange rate behavior often assume that CIP holds as a valid approximation. It is thus, not surprising that a fair amount of research has been devoted to the empirical validation of this condition.' Practitioners are interested in CIP because this condition may be used to simplify hedging practices for financial decisions.
Furthermore, significant violations of CIP can generate arbitrage opportunities for international market participants, resulting in profits. There are a number of important empirical questions that one must consider when examining CIP. The first deals with observed deviations from CIP.
A number of studies have identified significant deviations of forward rates from their covered interest parity (see e.g. Frenkel and Levich, 1975 , 1977 , 1981 Otani and Tiwar~1981; BahmaniOskooee and Das, 1985; Sharpe, 1985; Overturf, 1986; Clinton, 1988; Fletcher and Taylor, 1994; Abeysekera and Turtle, 1995) .' Previous research has attempted to rationalize these deviations from CIP in terms of optimizing behavior. Such an approach views deviations from CIP as a response to real world frictions, including transactions costs, [Frenkel and Levich (1975 , 1977 , 1981 ], capital market imperfections such as capital controls and/or political risk (Prachowny, 1970; Frenkel, 1973; Dooley and Isard, 1980; Otani and Tiwari, 1981; and Blenman 1991) , imperfect substitutability, political risk (Aliber, 1973) , as well as differential tax treatment, inelastic demand and supply schedules, and other risk premia influences. Such market frictions result in 'neutral bands' around the theoretical parity condition within which profitable arbitrage activities are not possible.
A second issue related to the magnitude of deviations from CIP is the speed with which short-run deviations from CIP are eliminated and convergence to equilibrium is achieved. Most 2 studies that examine the empirical validity of CIP deal mainly with the size of raw deviations relative to estimates of transactions costs (referred to as profitable trading opportunities) and pay less attention to the speed with which these profitable trading opportunities are eliminated.
However, using informal analysis Clinton (1988) concluded that, at least for the Euromarket, profitable trading opportunities are small and transitory. This result has been corroborated by the work Atkins (1991 Atkins ( , 1993 . Atkins employed cointegration methodology and reported results which suggest that deviations from CIP in the Euromarket are in general eliminated within two days, with this time decreasing as one moves from the 1970s through the 1980s.'
In this paper, we examine the dynamics of deviations from CIP for the UK using daily data over the period January 1974 to September 1993. First, similar to other studies we calculate the percentage of observations found to lie within the transactions costs bands (i.e. the so called 'neutral zone') as well as the percentage above and below these bands. To avoid indirect measures of transactions costs, our empirical investigation uses direct measures embedded in the bid-ask spread.' We find numerous observations in which the covered interest parity condition exceeds the transaction costs bands. In addition, we examine the persistence of these deviations over time.
The presence of transaction costs bands suggests that deviations from CIP should exhibit some nonlinear dynamics. One would expect that the persistence of deviations from CIP should be substantially lower outside the transactions cost bands than inside them as agents act to exploit the implied profit opportunities. Thus, the presence of transactions costs implies that deviations from covered interest parity might be modeled as a threshold autoregression (TAR) in which the dynamic behavior of deviations from CIP changed if they exceed the transactions cost bands.' In addition, to capture the variable volatility and the "fat-tailed" nature of deviations from CIP, we allowed for threshold-ARCH (TARCH) effects in which the conditional 3 variance of deviations from CIP can change over time and across thresholds. Using this threshold autorgression/threshold ARCH (TAR/TARCH) framework, we examine the difference in the dynamics of deviations from CIP that occur within the transactions costs bands versus the dynamics of those which occur outside the neutral zone by employing nonlinear impulse response analysis. By calculating impulse response functions conditional on whether one starts inside or outside the transactions cost band, we can compare the persistence of deviations from CIP that imply exploitable profit opportunities with those in which no profit opportunities exist.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature concerning covered interest parity and transactions costs. Section 3 presents the theoretical underpinnings of the literature on covered interest parity including a discussion of the role of transactions costs in the context of covered interest parity. Section 4 describes the data used.
Section 5 presents an empirical examination of deviations from CIP and compares findings with previous work in this area. Section 6 describes the threshold autoregression/threshold ARCH model employed to capture! these dynamics. Section 7 examines dynamics through the use of impulse response functions. Section 8 presents a summary and conclusion.
Brief Literature Review
A large portion of the empirical literature on deviations from covered interest parity has focused on the size of transactions costs. In two important papers Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977) , define a neutral zone as the area which surrounds the CIP condition above and below, within which observed deviations from CIP can occur without yielding any profit after netting out transactions costs. They estimate these transactions costs·in the market for foreign exchange by using data on triangular arbitrage and conclude that CIP holds net of transactions 4 costs. They also fmd evidence of a regular flow of profit opportunities in which the return exceeds transactions costs. However, the later work of Deardorff (1979 ), Callier (1981 , and Bahmani-Oskooee and Das (1985) argued that the size of the transactions costs were in reality much smaller than those reported by Frenkel and Levich.
Much of the ClP literature debates the magnitude of the neutral zone in the presence of transaction costs, liquidity risk, political risk, and other market frictions which would cause violations of ClP. Clinton (1988) , for example, demonstrated that the neglect of the swap market resulted in a serious overstatement of transactions costs and its introduction made the neutral zone even narrower than those found by Deardorff, Callier, and Bahmani-Oskooee and Das. Using daily observations over the period November 1985 to May 1986, in which careful attention was given to accurate timing, ' Clinton (1988) found that in the Euromarket, transactions costs should not give rise to deviations from ClP in excess of .06 percent between well traded currencies. 7 Although Clinton found that net deviations (i.e. net of transactions costs) from CIP were transitory and small enough to support the assumption of CIP, he also found that raw deviations often occurred outside transactions costs bands, and thus there were times in which profit opportunities were available.
More recently, Fletcher and Taylor (1994, 1996) examine whether CIP holds in markets for long-term assets.' They examine covered arbitrage boundary conditions in the Eurobond and foreign bond markets in the 5-, 7-, and 10 year maturities for five currency pairs. The empirical evidence which they present suggest that deviations from CIP (in excess of transactions costs) do exist. They find that these disequilibrium states can have long memories (that dissipate over time) which lead to a window of profitable trading opportunities. They also fmd that in every long-term market there is a set of outliers that substantially violate theClP condition. Most recently, Abeysekera and Turtle (1995) , using the Johansen VAR/error-eorrection methodology 5 and employed weekly data over the period 1984-1991, for Canada, Germany, Japan, and the UK, find substantial deviations from CIP over this period. Abeysekera and Turtle (1995; p. 433) may have anticipated our current research when they made the following points. "Without data on the level of market imperfections such as transaction costs or bid-ask spreads, we cannot comment on the presence of arbitrage opportunities." "...future research should attempt to incorporate bid-ask spreads and transaction costs directly into the analysis."
In the next section, we present the theoretical foundations of the literature on CIP along with a discussion of transactions costs in the context of CIP.
The Covered Interest Rate Parity Condition
A. CIF without Transactions Costs
In markets where arbitrage is active and unfettered, the net return offered by a financial instrument denominated in foreign currency should be approximately equal to the net return offered by a similar financial instrument denominated in domestic currency. This is the basis of the CIP condition. 
where F is the T-period forward exchange rate (foreign currency per domestic currency--in this case the US dollar), S is the spot exchange rate (foreign currency per US dollar), i, is the interest rate on foreign assets, i. is the interest rate on dollar denominated (domestic) assets, and T is the time to maturity of the assets" The left-hand-side of equation (1) is the forward exchange premium (FP) (or discount) and the right-hand-side of equation (1) is the nominal interest rate differential (ID).
B. Lender and Owner Arbitrage and Transaction Costs Bands
With transaction costs, the covered interest parity condition implied by no arbitrage given by equation (1) is replaced by a pair of conditions. Consider the case of no "lender" arbitrage.
Lender arbitrage is the case in which a trader can make riskless profits by borrowing one currency and then lending the other. For no lender arbitrage, the speculator does not take a position. One simply borrows, say $, and lends, say pounds, to make a riskless profit. In this case the investor puts up no capital of his own. The absence of "lender" arbitrage for borrowing dollars and lending the foreign currency implies the following condition
where SA is the asked spot rate (foreign currency per dollar) and P" is the bid forward rate (foreign currency per dollar), i A , is the asked interest rate on dollar deposits and i", is the bid interest rate on foreign deposits. A similar condition holds for no lender arbitrage for borrowing the foreign currency and lending dollars and is given by
(3)
Combining these conditions and rearranging implies Some additional algebra yields
(4)
The middle term of (4) (4) is violated (i.e. below the lower bounds) this implies a violation of equation (2) and it will pay to borrow dollars and lend pounds at the existing bid-ask spread.
Taking logarithm of equation (4), yields
where
The term cip is approximately the percentage deviation from the covered interest parity relationship evaluated at the geometric average of the bid and asked prices. The transaction 9 cost bands are given by 8' and 8
U •
Note that for lender arbitrage deviations from covered interest parity fluctuate in a region symmetric around zero. This region is determined solely on the basis of the ratio of bid and asked prices or the transactions costs.
We can also derive a similar condition for no "owner" arbitrage. Owner arbitrage is the case where a trader initially has a cash position in one currency and can invest in assets denominated in that currency or of another currency. Unlike lender arbitrage, owner arbitrage requires traders to put up their own capital. In this case where the investor has a cash position in $, the question is whether one should keep the $ or sell $ and purchase foreign currency.
The absence of "owner" arbitrage implies the following conditions:
and After some algebraic manipulation these conditions imply:
.B 1+1$ The transaction band is smaller for owner than for lender arbitrage since there is one less transaction that needs to take place--no borrowing has to be undertaken as the investor already has one of the assets. Note also that for owner arbitrage, cip is not necessarily bounded by a symmetric band; the band is only symmetric if the bid/ask ratio for the interest rates are the same.
Description of Data
Daily data on bid and ask prices for spot and forward exchange rates for the British The decision to employ Euro-deposit rates was motivated by several considerations. First, the use of Euro-deposit rates ensures that the underlying asset is comparable. Euro-deposits denominated in different currencies are issued by banks that have similar default risk. This means that term structures of different countries are comparable because they do not have to be adjusted for differing default risk. In addition, Euro-deposit rates are not subject to capital controls because they are offshore securities, and hence, rates in different countries do not have to be adjusted for differing capital controls. Thus, eurocurrency deposits are comparable in terms of credit risk, maturity, and issuer, but not in terms of currency denomination (see Levich (1985». Furthermore, high quality data for domestic interest rates are not easily obtained for all countries. In some countries, other than the U.S. and Canada, domestic Treasury bill rates are not always market clearing, and hence will not reflect the true cost of credit, while Eurodeposit rates are market clearing. Treasury bill rates are not always market clearing because in Taylor (1987) examined observations sampled 10 minutes apart during November 11, 12, and 13 of 1985 and failed to find a single violation of no arbitrage. This period is relatively stable compared with other periods in our sample. Even for periods examined in his second study (Taylor (1989», which overlap those in this study, the CIP condition was relatively stable.
Clinton (1988), on the other hand, fmds similar percentages to those shown in Table 1 There is also evidence of some very large deviations from covered interest parity in the sample. These coincide with several events such as the attack on the British pound and subsequent withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992. Many of these same observations also violate the no arbitrage conditions. Nonetheless, even after the outliers are removed (see second column of Table 1 ) there are still numerous violations of the no arbitrage conditions."
In Table 2 , we present the mean, median and standard deviations of the gross deviation from CIP and the transaction costs implied by no lender and no owner arbitrage. The mean deviation is stlHistically different from zero", this indicates that despite the symmetric transactions bands implied by no lender arbitrage some type of wedge causes the CIP condition
for the US and UK to systematically deviate from zero in one direction. Nonetheless, the mean deviation from CIP is dwarfed by its standard deviations, indicating that deviations are highly variable. As a comparison, the average lender transactions cost (i.e. 6 U )
is 0.0008 or 0.08 percent. This figure is slightly higher than that of Clinton (0.06 percent) but smaller than that of McCormick (0.09). The mean deviations from CIP is less than the mean of transactions costs which suggest that one could not make profits on average by randomly engaging in CIP arbitrage.
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As suggested by the results in Table 1 , there are a substantial number of instances during the sample in which the covered interest parity condition exceeds the transaction costs band.
These instances imply arbitrage profit opportunities. To better understand the nature of these opportunities, Figure 3 plots a histogram of the implied lender arbitrage profits over the sample.
For ease of interpretation we display these profits in terms of the approximate rate of return over the course of a year if these opportunities were available for every trading day during that period. 1S From Figure 3 , it is clear that most of the actual profit opportunities are relatively small-less than four percent on an "annual" basis. There appear to have been some very rare opportunities for extremely large profits over the course of the sample--on twelve occasions arbitrage profits entailed "annual" returns over 100%! Nevertheless, because arbitrage profit opportunities in general and large ones in particular are relatively rare, the scope to make large systematic profits from engaging in covered interest parity arbitrage is limited. Looking at the entire sample, including observations in which no profits were available, the average net profit was .0056 percent.
l •
This translates into an "annualized" return of 1.4 percent--a fairly paltry returns from engaging solely in dollarjpound covered interest arbitrage. The "annualized" rate of return from owner arbitrage is a more (respectable) 2.3 percent (average net profit of .0091 percent per transaction), although as we suggested above, to engage in owner arbitrage, arbitragers must put up their own capital.
Not only are profit opportunities from covered interest arbitrage relatively small, they are typically of short duration. 14 This discussion of profit opportunities is just meant to be suggestive rather than an exact accounting. The sampling interval of one day may be too long and it may be that adjustment actually takes place hourly. To the extent that this is a problem, the result would be a shorter adjustment time, and thus, the findings of this paper may be viewed as upper bounds on adjustment periods.
Empirical Analysis: Threshold Autoregressions for Covered Interest Parity
If the no arbitrage conditions strictly hold then deviations from covered interest parity should be bounded by the transactions costs bands. Yet, as we saw above there appear to be numerous and persistent deviations from CIP that exceed the transactions cost bands.
Nonetheless, even if deviations from CIP exceed the transactions bands, one might suspect that deviations from CIP outside the transactions cost bands would be substantially less persistent than those inside the transaction cost bands as market participants will eventually respond to large and/or persistent arbitrage opportunities.
A relatively simple model that can capture the possible change in persistence as covered interest parity condition moves outside the transactions cost band is a threshold autoregression.
Here the parameters of an autoregression for dp, change depending on whether dp,_! is above, inside, or below the transactions cost bands. Specifically, let dp, be described by a threshold autoregression (TAR): In addition, as in many financial time series, the volatility of cip, appears to change over time and that shocks to cip, appear to be characterized by a "fat-tailed u distribution (hence the numerous outliers). As a result, we allow for the conditional distribution of E, to differ across regimes and over time. 
(9)
Because we take the thresholds to be the bid/ask transactions cost band, the thresholds are assumed to be known and, hence, need not be estimated. Therefore, we estimated the In order to calculate the conditional expectations for the nonlinear model, we essentially simulate the model. Because there is a single shock and that shock affects the one-step-ahead forecast linearly, in the initial period change in conditional expectations is just the value of the shock. In order to calculate the conditional expectations, E[cipI+kIDl-l,eJ and E[cipI+kIDI_J, in each subsequent period, however, we must simulate two separate histories: one in which the shock at time t is known and one in which the at time t is not known but determined randomly.
In each period we draw a standardized shock, v t +" using resampled standardized residuals (standardized by the conditional variance). Note this shock is conditional on regime because the distribution of actual standardized residuals may differ across regimes. Thus, when the simulated value for cipI+i_' is above the transaction cost band, we draw a standardized residual from observation in which the upper regime was entered. The innovation e,+i is calculated by scaling up V'+i by the conditional standard deviation, hi+i' Again, h,+i depends on the simulated values of cipt+H and e"+i." This simulation gives a hypothetical history for cipI+" i = 0 to k. We repeat this simulation 200 times, keeping the values of D,., and e, the same for each simulation but drawing different realizations of V'+i' We average the simulations to obtain estimates of the conditional expectations, E[cip'+k IDl-l'e,] and E[cip<+k I11,.,].
As suggested above, the IRFs are a function of the value of the shock, e" and the initial conditions, D,_,. To evaluate the sensitivity of the IRF to the size and direction of the shock, we calculated IRFs for positive versus negative, and small versus large shocks. Here we considered two alternative ways to of specifying "small" versus "large" shocks. First, to get a clear sense of the difference in persistence across regimes, we conducted an experiment in which the size of the shock was the same regardless of the current regime. To determine size of the 19 shock, we then took a small shock to be equal to the 84th percentile of the distribution of actual nonstandardized residuals while a large shock was set to be the 97.7th percentile." Because in reality the distribution of shocks differs across regimes, we considered a second way of specifying the initial shock. In this case, e, = h. '/ 'v, where both h, and the distribution of v, are conditional on regime. If, for example, cip,., > 8,." then a "small" v, shock was set to be the 84th percentile of standardized residuals for observations in the upper regime while a large shock was set the 97.7th percentile. Selecting v, shocks when in the other regimes was conducted in a similar fashion. The end result is that in this case "small" and "large" e, shocks Jould differ across regimes and over time.
We also calculated IRFs for two different types of initial conditions. For the first, we determined the initial condition by randomly drawing an initial condition, unconditionally, from the actual data. This was repeated 500 times and the resulting IRFs were averaged to yield an IRF for cip" unconditional on 0,.,.
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Alternatively, we calculate impulse response functions conditional on regime. For example, for the IRF in the middle regime we randomly selected as initial conditions dates in which the cip, series was in the middle regime. Likewise for the upper and lower regimes. Again, we repeated these experiments 500 times and took the average to estimate the IRF conditional on regime." By comparing these conditional IRFs, we can get an indication of how the dynamics (and persistence) differs across regimes.
Finally, one last complication presents itself. Because the transaction cost band is not constant over time, we had to specify the behavior of the thresholds when calculating the impulse response function. The actual transaction band at time t-l was taken as part of the initial condition (0,.,). However, current and future values of the thresholds were required for the simulations used to calculate E[cip '+kIO,."eJ and E[cip'+kIO,.,] . Again, we set values for the thresholds in periods t to t +k equal to the actual transactions cost band in those periods. in the outer regimes display less persistence than do shocks in the middle reiime. The reasoning is as follows. Starting in the upper regime, a large positive shock is likely to cause the CIP condition to remain outside the transactions cost bands in the initial period while a negative shock is likely to push the CIP condition inside the transaction band. In the subsequent period the different response to a positive and negative shock reflect primarily the dynamic structure of the upper regime versus that of the middle regime. As a result, the different response in the outer regimes to positive and negative shocks reflects different degrees of persistence in the various regimes. The difference in persistence can also be seen by comparing the middle and upper (lower) regime response to a "large" positive (negative) shock.
Again, positive (negative) shocks are dissipated faster in the upper (lower) regime than in the middle regime. Figure 5 displays IRFs for the case where the size of the initial shock is conditional on current regime. Once more, the impulse response function for the lower regime is asymmetric--suggesting less persistence outside of the transactions band than inside the band. On the other hand, the asymmetry is not as apparent for the upper regime In addition, one can see that, on average, "large" shocks in the outer and lower regimes are substantially larger than those in the middle regime (nearly twice as large). Also, the fact that the distribution of shocks for the 21 middle and upper regimes has fatter tails than that of the lower regime (see also the estimated values of t-distribution degrees of freedom, Il', in Table A2 of the Appendix) shows up in Figure   5 . "Large" shocks for both the middle and upper regimes are nearly three times larger than the "small" shocks for these regimes while for the lower regime this ratio is less than 2.5.
Summary and Conclusion
A large amount of research has been devoted to the empirical validation of the covered interest parity (CIP). Most studies that examine the empirical validity of CIP deal mainly with the size of raw deviations relative to estimates of transactions costs and pay less attention to the speed with which these profitable trading opportunities are eliminated. This paper contributes and extends the above research on CIP in a number of respects. We argue the presence of transaction cost bands suggests that deviations from CIP should exhibit some nonlinear dynamics. In particular, the persistence of deviations from CIP should be substantially lower outside the transaction cost bands (where there are potential profit opportunities) than inside them. Thus, we model deviations from covered interest parity as a threshold autoregression with threshold ARCH effects (TAR/TARCH) in which the dynamics of deviations from CIP within the transaction cost bands differ from the dynamics of those occur outside the transactions cost band. Using nonlinear impulse response analysis, we compare the persistence of deviations from CIP that imply exploitable profit opportunities with those in which no profit opportunities exist.
Using daily data for the US and UK over the period January 1974 to September 1993, we find numerous observations in which the covered interest parity condition exceeds the transaction cost bands. Such findings call into question the practice of constructing forward exchange rates using spot exchange rates and interest rate differentials, assuming CIP holds.'" 22 Nonetheless, because arbitrage profit opportunities in general, and large ones in particular, are relatively rare, the scope to make large systematic profits from engaging in covered interest parity is limited. Furthermore, using impulse response functions implied by the threshold autoregressive/threshold ARCH model, we find that deviations from covered interest parity that are outside the transaction cost bands are less persistent than those inside the bands. Thus, not only are profit opportunities from covered interest arbitrage relatively small, they are typically of short duration. 4. Rhee and Chang (1992) have argued that indirect measures of transactions costs, such as those used by Frenkel and Levich are not appropriate for examining the frequency of mar~et equilibrium for at least two reasons. First, the validity of indirect measures of transactions costs require that costs structures built into triangular arbitrage remain stable. Unfortunately, equilibrium conditions tend to be violated when markets are unstable. Second, the indirect measures represent only an average cost which does not capture the degree of uncertainty associated with each and every arbitrage transaction. To be exact, the frequency of market disequilibrium should be compiled based on individual transactions.
5. Balke and Fomby (1997) argue that transactions costs could give rise to time series that are threshold cointegrated in which movement back towards a long-run equilibrium occurs only if deviations from the equilibrium are "large". Along these lines, Anderson (1994) applies threshold cointegration to the term structure of interest rates and estimates threshold error correction models for the term structure.
6. Other studies which have demonstrated that timing and accuracy of data is important include McCormick (1979) , Maasoumi and Pippenger (1989 ), and Taylor (1987 ,1989 . McCormick (1979) has analyzed the effects of using different closing prices from markets in different time zones (e.g. close in New York for the OM and the close in London for the British pound) and finds that deviations from triangular arbitrage declines substantially when exchange rates are quoted simultaneously. Taylor (1987 Taylor ( , 1989 ) use high quality, high-frequency data (five-and ten-minute) to examine the hypothesis that the apparent unexploited profit opportunities for arbitrage may be the result of inappropriate data, including issues of measurement error and timing. He finds very few deviations from CIP when institutional detail was considered. More recently, Rhee and Chang (1992) examined the frequency of simultaneous equilibrium on four markets using real-time quotations drawn from Eurocurrency and interbank foreign exchange markets during the morning trading hours of New York. Profit opportunities were examined not only for one-way but also for covered interest arbitragers. Their results indicate that i) profit opportunities from traditional covered interest arbitrage are rarely available, ii) the frequency of attaining market equilibrium was low, thus, opening the door for one-way arbitrage, and iii) profits from one-way arbitrage persist, indicating why one-way arbitragers do not search for the least-cost arbitrage route.
7. These results were in contrast to those of Frenkel and Levich (1981) . Frenkel and Levich (1981) employed Treasury bill rates for the US and Canada over the period [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] and calculated a transaction cost equivalent to 0.125 percent per annum from bid-ask spreads, which is twice as large as those reported in Clinton (1988).
8. If short-and long-term assets were perfect substitutes within currencies, then CIP among longterm assets could be regarded as an extension of the short-term CIP literature discussed above. However, Popper (1993) points out that assets of different maturities are not easily substitutable, and thus a different analysis is required for markets in which assets with long maturities are traded.
9. Much of the literature examining CIP assumes that forward contracts are the relevant instrument for evaluating CIP. But a large amount of 'forward' trading in foreign exchange is done through swap transactions. As Clinton (1988) illustrates, this has important implications for evaluating the transactions cost bands for a CIP-based arbitrage. Another caveat that should be pointed out is that it is usually assumed that i. and it are interest rates on the assets with the same characteristics. This is why in this study we employ euro-deposit rates. If the interest rates used are on Treasury bills, the two securities of the two different countries will usually not have the same risk characteristics.
10. Several filters were run on the data to check for errors, and unfortunately some errors were found. After consultations with the staff at DRI the errors were corrected. '
11. T= 1/12 here as euro-deposit rates are annual and forward rates have a 1 month maturity. We could have alternatively multiplied the forward premium by 12, however, the chosen specification is consistent with the model used in this paper.
12. Point estimates of deviations from CIP calculated from posted bids and asks will not in general be equal to the actual deviations on either side of the bid or ask. The quotes actually only define a range within which trades may take place, while dealers normally negotiate for finer spreads than those posted. Thus, we calculate all interest rates variables as the geometric average of the bid-ask spread.
13. We removed observations in which the standardized residuals from a linear autoregression were greater than four. The rather large sample size made more formal, iterative outlier searches such as Tsay (1988) impracticable.
14. The standard error of the sample mean is 8.0053 X 10-6.
15. The approximate annual profit lender arbitrage = (1 + 71".)250 -1, where 71", is equal to Iciptl OUt if Icipt I -OUt > 0 and equal to zero otherwise. 71", is the rate of return for a given arbitrage opportunity, so to get annual return we assume 250 trading days or (arbitrage opportunities) in a year. As these profits apply to the no lender arbitrage case, the number of days in figure 3 sum to 527 (506 in upper regime and 121 in the lower-osee Table 1 : full sample, No Lender Arbitrage).
16. This is similar to the profits for dollarIpound arbitrage found by Clinton.
17. The threshold autoregression for covered interest parity would imply threshold cointegration (see Balke and Fomby (1997» for the forward premium for exchange rates and the interest differential if the autoregression in the middle regime contained a unit root. However, in this case deviations from covered interest parity appear to be stationary in all three regimes.
18. We did not separately examine a TAR/TARCH model for no owner arbitrage transactions bands. The lender arbitrage case is the more the binding of the two as all instances of lender arbitrage will also be instances of owner arbitrage. Furthermore, estimation of the basic TAR model with the no owner arbitrage transactions bands yielded very similar results to those presented in the paper. Thus, to save space we present results ouly for the no lender arbitrage case.
19. We also experimented with the estimation of a smooth transition autoregressive model but difficulties in estimating the curvature of the transition functions forced us to settle on the discrete threshold model as it is a more parsimonious model which does not require the specification of transition functions.
20. Our use of a parametric distribution for v, ouly affects our estimation of the threshold model. In the simulations used to construct impulse responses described below, we use the realized standardized residuals as v, shocks.
21. Tables Al and A2 in the appendix present the details of the estimated threshold models. All calculations including the impulse response analysis discussed below were conductf)d using RATS Version 4.1. '
22. One can also reject the hypothesis that the autoregressive models for the upper and lower regimes are equal. Similarly, for the ARCH models.
23. The lag length for the TAR was set at ten lags. For the TAR model estimated by OLS, this was not sufficient to eliminate all the serial correlation in the residuals; however, when examining the autocorrelation function of the residuals, it appears that this remaining serial correlation is the result of correlation of residuals at infrequent and irregular lags. This correlation is eliminated once ARCH effects and a "fat-tailed" distribution for standardized shocks are allowed.
24. See Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) and Gallant, Rossi, Tauchen (1993) for a discussion of nonlinear impulse response analysis.
25. If the shocks were normally distributed, these would correspond to approximately one and two standard deviation shocks.
26. For example, we first draw an initial date '1", from the actual data and calculate the IRF conditional on that date. We then reselect another date '1"" with replacement, and calculate another IRF. This is continued until 500 initial dates have been selected for the model and then take the average to obtain an IRF for cip.
27. When conditioning on each regime, we draw 500 different initial dates from the respective regime and then take averages of the resulting IRFs. This gives us three conditional IRFs--one for each regime, upper, lower, middle. These three, combined with the IRF obtained from drawing initial dates from the full sample yields the four IRFs displayed in Figures 4 and 5.
28. In a previous version of this paper, we considered using a threshold autoregression to model the bid/ask spread itself. However, the results were not substantially different from those reported here. In future work, we hope the develop a more interesting model of the bid/ask spread, so that we better explore the joint dynamics between the covered interest parity condition and the bid/ask spread. 
